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COMMITMENT SCHEMES AND DIOPHANTINE EQUATIONS
JOSÉ FELIPE VOLOCH
Abstract. Motivated by questions in cryptography, we look for diophantine equations that
are hard to solve but for which determining the number of solutions is easy.
1. Commitment Schemes
Solving a diophantine equation is typically hard but, given a point, it is typically easy
to find a variety containing that point. This is an example of a “one-way function” with
potential applications to cryptography. Our current (lack of) knowledge suggests that such
a function is possibly quantum resistant and, therefore, cryptosystems based on these could
be used for post-quantum cryptography [BL17].
An encryption system based on this principle was proposed by Akiyama and Goto [AG06,
AG08], then broken by Ivanov and the author [IV09]. It was then fixed, broken again, fixed
again,... Current status unclear.
The purpose of a commitment scheme is for a user to commit to a message without
revealing it (e.g. vote, auction bid) by making public a value obtained from the message in
such a way that one can check, after the message is revealed, that the public value confirms
the message.
Using such diophantine one-way functions for commitment schemes was proposed by
Boneh and Corrigan-Gibbs [BCG14]. They also suggested to work modulo an RSA modu-
lus N . This could conceivably weaken the system. It will definitely no longer be quantum
resistant. Some partial attacks on this particular system are presented in [ZW17].
Here is the general format of a diophantine commitment scheme. Encode a message as
point P over some field F . Make public a variety V/F with P ∈ V , with V taken from
some fixed family of varieties. To check the commitment, one verifies that P satisfies the
equations of V . We need the following conditions to be satisfied for this to work:
• Given P , it is easy to construct V .
• Given V , it is hard to find V (F ) (hence P ).
• Given V (and perhaps P ), it is easy to verify that #V (F ) = 1.
The last condition is important to prevent cheating. It proves that P was indeed the com-
mitted message. In general, a commitment scheme consists of two algorithms Commit(m,r),
Reveal(m,r,c). The first takes as input a message m and a random string r to produce an
output c, which is then made public. The second takes as input m,r,c as before and outputs
yes or no, depending on whether c is the correct output of Commit(m,r). The randomness
is needed, e.g., if the list of possible messages is small enough that it can be brute force
searched. See [BCG14, Section 4.1] for a more precise definition of a commitment scheme
and some discussion.
These commitment schemes are similar in spirit to the class of multivariate polynomial
cryptosystems. In analogy to what is done there, it is conceivable to have encryption by
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selecting a subset of varieties V/F such that V (F ) can be easily found but that V can be
disguised as a general member of the collection of varieties. We do not address the interesting
problem of doing this for schemes we consider.
2. Diophantine Equations
Answering a question of Friedman, Poonen [Poo10] proved:
Theorem 2.1. Assuming the Bombieri-Lang conjecture, there exists f(x, y) ∈ Q[x, y] in-
ducing an injection Q×Q→ Q.
Boneh and Corrigan-Gibbs [BCG14] then use the following construction from such a func-
tion. For P = (a, b), take V : f(x, y) = f(a, b) to get a commitment scheme fitting the
general setting of section 1. Unfortunately, Poonen’s proof, besides being conditional on a
conjecture, is also non-constructive!
Zagier suggested f(x, y) = x7 + 3y7 as a polynomial defining an injective function. But
we don’t have a proof. With exponent 13 instead of 7, the abcd conjecture implies that this
function essentially injective.
Question 2.2. Is solving x7 + 3y7 = k over Q hard?
Pasten [Pas20] proved that there exists an affine surface S of the form U × U with S(Q)
Zariski-dense in S and a morphism S → A1 inducing an injection S(Q) → Q. But, S(Q) is
too sparse to be cryptographically useful.
Cornelissen [Cor99], using that the abcd conjecture is true for function fields of character-
istic 0, noted that xm + tym is injective in k(t), chark = 0 for m large.
Question 2.3. Is solving xm + tym = k over Q(t) hard?
My guess is that the answer is no.
He also noted that xp+ typ is injective in k(t), chark = p. But solving xp+ typ = k is easy.
The following was noted in [SV20], with the proof being an extension of [Vol85] (see also
[Wan99] for a related result without a hypothesis on the degree of the morphism):
Theorem 2.4. Let K be a function field of a curve C of genus g with field of constants F of
characteristic p > 0 and let S be a finite set of places of K. If u1, . . . , ut are S-units of K,
linearly independent over F , such that the degree of the morphism (u1 : · · · : ut) : C → P
t−1
is less than p and satisfy
u1 + · · ·+ ut = 1
then
max{deg ui|i = 1, . . . , t} ≤
t(t− 1)
2
(2g − 2 + #S)
The above result implies the injectivity of x13 + ty13 in the set of pairs of elements of
k(t)− k of degree at most p/13 if 13 ∤ p(p− 1).
This is enough for the application to commitment schemes by taking a sufficiently large
finite field k and considering the function x13 + ty13 restricted to the above set where the
function is injective.
But the function is not injective in the whole of k(t). Indeed, if x13 + ty13 = k, q = p12,
then
(xq/k(q−1)/13)13 + t(t(q−1)/13yq/k(q−1)/13)13 = k
2
3. Curves on surfaces
The cryptosystem of Akiyama and Goto [AG06,AG08] actually uses curves on surfaces
over finite fields. We now consider the use of rational curves on surfaces in P3 over a finite
field for commitment schemes.
We start with a rational curve P parametrized by (f0 : f1 : f2 : f3) in P
3 over a finite field
Fq, where the fi’s are polynomials of degree at most m (i.e a point in P
3 over Fq(t)). Such
a curve will include the message and randomness and our commitment will be a smooth
surface S/Fq of degree d containing P . This is a bit different from previous schemes as the
surface is constant (i.e. independent of t). If S is given by an homogeneous equation F = 0,
the condition that P ⊂ S is simply F (f0, f1, f2, f3) = 0 which can be viewed as a system of
linear equation on the coefficients of F , once the fi are given. There are
(
d+3
3
)
coefficients
and dm+1 equations. One has solutions to the system as soon as there are more coefficients
than equations but these are not guaranteed to be smooth. Poonen [Poo08] has proved that,
for d large, a positive proportion of those solutions do indeed give smooth surfaces. One
expects in practice that, as long as the finite field is big enough, there will be plenty of
smooth surfaces.
To guarantee uniqueness of the curve P inside S, we prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Let S/Fq be a smooth surface in P
3 of degree d > 3 with Picard number two.
Then S contains at most one smooth rational curve of degree m, if m < 2d(d− 4)/(d− 2).
Proof. Let H be a hyperplane section and D1, D2 two distinct smooth rational curves of
degree m contained in S. We compute the determinant of matrix of intersection pairings for
H,D1, D2 and show it is non-zero, hence these curves are independent in the Néron-Severi
group, contradicting the hypothesis on the Picard number.
Clearly, H2 = d,HDi = m, i = 1, 2. The canonical class of S is (d−4)H , so the adjunction
formula gives D2i + (d − 4)HDi = −2, hence D
2
i = −(2 + (d − 4)m). Let δ = D1D2. The
determinant of matrix of intersection pairings is therefore
∣
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
H2 HD1 HD2
D1H D
2
1 D1D2
D2H D2D1 D
2
2
∣
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
d m m
m −(2 + (d− 4)m) δ
m δ −(2 + (d− 4)m)
∣
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
=
−dδ2 + 2m2δ + d(2 + (d− 4)m)2 +m2(2 + (d− 4)m).
This vanishes precisely when δ = −(2+ (d−4)m), 2m2/d+(2+(d−4)m). The first value is
negative so cannot be D1D2 and the second value is bigger than m
2 by our hypothesis but
D1D2 ≤ m
2 by Bézout’s theorem so cannot be D1D2 either.

To apply the theorem, we need to know that the Picard number of S is at most two. For a
given surface, this can be done using the algorithm of [Cos15], for example. This algorithm
computes the L-function of S and the Picard number of S is the multiplicity of q as a root
of the L-function, conditional on the Tate conjecture. However, the surfaces we construct
will have Picard number at least two and a theorem of Tate shows that the multiplicity of q
as a root of the L-function is an upper bound for the Picard number. So, if this multiplicity
is two, it is verified that the Picard number is two. There is a parity condition coming from
the functional equation for L-functions which implies that this will not work if d is odd. It
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is reasonable to expect that a sizable proportion of such surfaces have Picard number two if
d is even, but this is not currently known and is worthy of further investigation.
In sum, our commitment scheme is as follows, with a finite field Fq and integers m, d
selected a priori.
(1) Encode a message as well as some randomness within (f0, f1, f2, f3), fi ∈ Fq[t], deg fi ≤
m.
(2) Choose a random F ∈ Fq[x0, x1, x2, x3] homogeneous of degree d with F (f0, f1, f2, f3) =
0.
(3) Check whether the surface defined by F = 0 is smooth and has Picard number two.
If so, publish F as the commitment. If not, pick a different F in step (2).
For an explicit example, consider m = 3, d = 6. For a sextic surface to contain a given
twisted cubic, one needs to satisfy a system of 19 equations in 84 variables and, hopefully,
many of those will give rise to smooth surfaces with Picard number two. The space of
available messages depends on 16 variables.
One can also use m = 3, d = 4. The inequality in the theorem is not satisfied but the
second value for δ is 13/2, which is not an integer so cannot be D1D2 and the result holds. In
this case, we have a system of 13 equations in 35 variables for the coefficients of the surface
and again, the space of available messages depends on 16 variables.
The expansion from 16 variables to 84 (or 35) from the message to the commitment is
potentially wasteful and it is worth investigating whether a priori setting many of these
variables to zero will still allow enough variability so that step (3) above succeeds. Another
issue worth studying is the choice of q. In some ways, small q is better for computations.
But if a very small value of q, such as q = 2 is chosen, then m = 3 is too small, as it allows
brute force searching for the rational curve.
Given a surface, to find a rational curve inside it, one can either do a brute force search on
the coefficients of the parametrization, or set up a system of equations for these coefficients
and try to solve it, e.g, using Gröbner bases. Neither option seem particularly efficient.
Neither option also appears to be much improved by the use of quantum computers. There
are general algorithms in the literature (e.g. [PTvL15]) that compute the Néron-Severi group
of a variety but these make no claim of practicality.
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